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Product platforms are assets shared by multiple products. Their primary purpose is to offer product
variety while keeping time-to-market and operational costs down. As new products are developed
over time, the question arises when to replace a platform. The repetitive use of the same platform
for multiple product generations keeps platform development time and costs low. As the platform
gets obsolete, however, the time and efforts to adapt the platform to the newest product will go
up. With these dynamics in mind, we develop a simulation model to gain insight into the desired
platform replacement planning. We examine how platform replacements are impacted by a firm’s
performance objectives, the speed of innovation, and the competitive landscape.
Keywords: product platforms, platform replacement, simulation, performance objectives, innova-
tion
1 Introduction
The increase in product variety in response to customer needs and fierce competition puts pressure
on operations, such as costs related to inventory, production, and research and development, as well
as time-to-market of new product introductions (Sawhney, 1998). To manage the increased product
variety in a cost- and time-efficient manner, companies in diverse industries have introduced product
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Figure 1: Total sales figures, product generation, and platform replacement planning, 1997-2017,
for Audi A3 and Mercedes-Benz A-class cars (Source: Carsalesbase-website (2018)).
platforms (Simpson et al., 2014; Muffatto and Roveda, 2002). Product platforms can be defined as
“a set of subsystems and interfaces that form a common structure from which a set of products can
be derived”(Meyer and Lehnerd, 1997). The use of platforms is well-known in automotive, where
the chassis of the car is used as a common platform for multiple products (Alizon et al., 2009). Also
other companies, including HP, Xerox, Canon, Sony, Boeing, and Swatch, make use of common
platforms to cope with their product variety (de Weck et al., 2003).
In this article we focus on one aspect that has received surprisingly little research attention
in the product platform literature - platform replacement planning (Zhang, 2015). The timely
replacement of a platform is important for companies to keep up with current technologies and
to respond to competition in dynamic environments. The car manufacturer Volvo, for instance,
recently replaced its platform to accommodate for electric cars (Lambert, 2017). Barco, a Belgian
technology company that specializes in digital projection and imaging technology, is another exam-
ple that replaced its first generation platforms of its high-tech medical displays (Boute et al., 2017).
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The timing of platform replacement may have an important impact on the company’s performance
(McGrath, 1996; Meyer et al., 2018). Kodak, a technology company producing camera-related
products, for instance, was able to win back market share from it competitor Fuji by introducing
a new platform (Robertson and Ulrich, 1998). Their platform allowed them to introduce more
new products in a shorter time than Fuji. Figure 1 illustrates the sales figures of two competing
products, the Audi A3 and Mercedes-Benz A-class (Carsalesbase-website, 2018), in the period 1997-
2017. For each new product generation of the Audi A3, a new platform was developed, resp. PQ34
and PQ35 for the first and second generation, and the MQB platform for the third generation. For
the Mercedes-Benz A-class, the first two product generations (W168 and W169) were derived from
the same platform, and a new platform was developed for the third product generation (W176).
Both companies seem to have a different planning with regard to their platform replacements. The
sales numbers also illustrate the life cycle of product demand. These contemporary examples show
the relevance and need to study platform replacement planning.
Replacing platforms frequently requires high development costs and time. On the other hand,
an obsolete platform may require long adaptation times to adjust the old platform to the newest
product needs. We develop a simulation model that takes these trade-offs into account to determine
the optimal platform replacement, i.e., for how many product generations should a platform be used.
While its logic spurs from existing literature and reality, it is a stylized, generalizable model. First,
we analyze how the platform replacement timings are impacted by the company’s performance
objectives, such as profit or market share maximization, or risk minimization. Second, we also
analyze the speed at which new technologies become available. We denote the latter by the speed
of innovation. Finally, we also study the effect of the competitor’s platform replacement decisions.
These factors were posited by Keeney and Raiffa (1993), Magnusson and Pasche (2014), and Kang
et al. (2012), respectively.
Our results provide guidance for firms on their platform replacement timings, and show how
contextual factors, such as innovation speed and competition, can be taken into account. For
instance, we find that it is not always optimal to replace platforms faster than the competition.
Our results also help firms understand why different departments, each with their own performance
objectives, might have conflicting opinions on the optimal platform replacement timings. For
instance, when one wants to minimize risk, the platform typically lasts longer compared to when
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one aims to maximize profit and market share.
2 Literature Review
The literature on product platforms is rich, as illustrated by the reviews of Jiao et al. (2007),
Simpson et al. (2014), and Zhang (2015). Platforms enable mass customization by combining the
benefits of mass production, such as reduced development time and cost due to the standardization
of the platforms, with the ability to offer a wide range of customized products that can be derived
from the platforms (Muffatto, 1999a; Fogliatto et al., 2012). One should also take into account,
however, the cost and time to customize the platforms to new products (Van den Broeke et al.,
2015), the cost of potential over-design of the platforms (Krishnan and Gupta, 2001a), and the risk
of platform obsolescence (Kang et al., 2012; Tyagi et al., 2015).
Extensive studies are devoted to finding the optimal platform design and configuration (e.g., Agard
and Bassetto, 2013; Farrell and Simpson, 2010). Although several authors, such as Meyer and
Lehnerd (1997), Krishnan and Gupta (2001a), and Halman et al. (2003), highlight the importance
of platform replacement, to date, the topic is under-explored (Sköld and Karlsson, 2012; Zhang,
2015). Our study aims to fill that gap.
Driven by continuous changes in technology and their potential obsolescence, product platforms
may be altered, modified, or even abandoned over time (Mäkinen et al., 2014). Platforms thus have
a life cycle, which is different from the life cycle of the products derived from them (Wortmann and
Alblas, 2009; Levandowski, 2014). When new products are introduced, one must decide whether
they will be developed from an existing platform or whether an entirely new platform is developed
for these (and future) new products (Halman et al., 2003). Meyer and Lehnerd (1997) refer to the
former as “platform adaptation”, indicating that particular subsystems of the platform are enhanced
or changed or new subsystems added, without completely overhauling the existing system. The
latter, referred to as “platform replacement”, indicates that the product architecture is redesigned
to incorporate major new platform subsystems and interfaces. Frequent platform replacements
comes with high development costs (Halman et al., 2003). An obsolete platform may on the other
hand not be capable to cope with new product innovations, if the company fails to replace its
platforms timely.
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Pasche and Magnusson (2011) and Tyagi et al. (2015) deal with the problem of platform ob-
solescence. They study how a robust platform can (or should) be configured to cope with new
product generations, through component and architectural innovation. Jana et al. (2018) investi-
gate the value of postponing the start of the platform development. This allows to capture more
technological innovation in its platform. To keep time-to-market short, the product development
time can be shorted at the expense of an increased development cost. Kang et al. (2012) offset the
cost efficiencies in development when extending the platform lifetime against the lost sales due to
obsolete platform technologies.
Our simulation model contributes to the literature by examining the impact of different per-
formance objectives, such as profit and market share maximization or minimization of financial
risk, whereas Kang et al. (2012), for instance, only focus on profit maximization. Our underlying
motivation is that product development decisions, including platform replacement, almost always
entail multiple objectives, among which there are trade-offs or priorities (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993).
Moreover, these objectives often serve as key performance metrics to assess R&D project success
and new product development (McNally et al., 2013).
Our contribution also lies in the impact analysis of contextual factors, such as the industry’s
innovation speed and competition. Mäkinen et al. (2014) expressed this need. For example, Kang
et al. (2012) found an unanticipated relationship between competition and the platform lifetime.
On the one hand, they expect that under severe competition, companies competitively introduce
new products and product innovation is accelerated. This may drive more frequent platform re-
placements to include the latest technologies. On the other hand, however, they empirically found
that the platform lifetime is not necessarily shorter, or can even be longer, under severe competi-
tion. As competitors take away market share, revenues may be lower, which is in turn compensated
by a reduction of their development costs. There seems to be a need to better understand how
contextual factors, such as competition, influence platform replacement planning.
In the next section, we describe our simulation model and its assumptions. Section 4 is devoted to
a discussion of the results of our analysis.
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qmax Product introduction
j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 j = 5 j = 6 j = ...
0 x x x x x x x
1 x o x o x o x
2 x o o x o o x
3 x o o o x o o
4 x o o o o x o
Table 1: Platforms are renewed every qmax+1 product introductions (x= new platform development;
o= existing platform adaptation for the j-th product introduction).
3 Problem description and simulation model
We simulate a duopoly setting with two competing firms, wherein each company introduces n new
products over time. A new product introduction j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is linked to the availability of
new technologies. Similar to Huisman (2013) and Sahal (1974), we characterize the speed at which
new technologies become available by a Poisson process with rate parameter λ; we designate this
parameter “speed of innovation”. When a new technological innovation emerges, one can decide to
either develop (replace) a new platform with this newest technology, or one can re-use the existing
platform, and derive the new technology from this existing platform (Khadke and Gershenson,
2008; Muffatto, 1999b).
We assume in our model that the focal firm has one main competitor, who also introduces
the same product generations j ∈ {1, ..., n}, inspired by the same speed of innovation. Both
companies make their platform replacement planning when their first platform is developed and
this planning remains unchanged over time. We consider both the situation where the focal firm
and its competitor make their platform replacement planning independently from each other, as
well as when they take into account each other’s possible platform replacement planning. We also
assume that a company does not have more than one platform in use at the same time. Platforms
are replaced every qmax + 1 product introductions, where qmax is the decision variable. A new
developed platform for the j-th product introduction is denoted platform i = j. When the j-th
product is adapted from an existing platform, platform i = j − q, where 0 < q ≤ qmax. When
qmax = 0, a new platform is developed for each new product and the platform is never reused for a
subsequent product. When qmax = 1, a platform is used for two consecutive product introductions,
etc. The higher qmax, the less platform replacements. Without loss of generalizability, we assume
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5 products to be the maximum number of products derived from a platform before it becomes
technically infeasible to derive a new product from that platform (i.e., qmax is at most 4). Table 1
illustrates this principle.
We now discuss the trade-offs inherent to the platform replacement decision (section 3.1), the
characterization of product demand (section 3.2), the role of competition (section 3.3), followed by
a definition of our three performance objectives (section 3.4). Finally, we discuss the design of the
simulation experiment (section 3.5).
3.1 Trade-off between platform development and platform adaptation time
A company’s platform replacement decision is to a large extent driven by the trade-off between the
time to develop a new platform and the time to adapt an existing platform to the newest product.
We refer to Van den Broeke and Boute (2014) for an illustration of platform development versus
adaptation times for the development of high-tech screens. In our model, we assume that both
platform development and adaptation times are stochastic, and denote tdi the random variable of
the time required to develop platform i, and taj,q the time required to adapt product j from platform
i = j − q (with taj,0 = 0).
In line with Krishnan and Gupta (2001a), we assume that developing a platform from scratch
takes more time than adapting an existing platform to the product’s needs, unless the platform is
getting close to obsolescence, at which point adaptation time can exceed platform development time
(Mäkinen et al., 2014). We model the time to adapt product j from its previous platform i = j− 1
as a percentage 0 ≤ αa ≤ 1 of the time to develop a new platform i = j. As the gap q between
platform i and product j increases, the adaptation time increases accordingly. More specifically,
the time required to adapt product j from platform i = j − q, given a platform development time







For example, if αa = 0.50, then the adaptation time to derive product j from platform i = j−1 is
half the time of developing a new platform i = j, or taj,1 = 0.50t
d
j . Analogously, the adaptation time
to derive product j from a platform that was developed at i = j−2, is then taj,2 = 0.50tdj−1 +0.50tdj .








j,3 . . .
1 9 . . .
2 12 6 . . .
3 8 4 10 . . .
4 10 5 9 15 . . .
Table 2: Illustrative example of platform development and adaptation times for αa = 0.50.
Figure 2: Illustration of two different platform replacement strategies for three consecutive product
introductions.
time-to-market of product j is then given by tdj if a new platform is developed, or t
a
j,q if it is adapted
from a previous platform j−q. It illustrates how the total time required for a product introduction
is influenced by the decision whether it is developed from a new platform or adapted from an
existing platform.
Figure 2 illustrates two different platform replacement strategies, and their impact on the
resulting time-to-market for product introductions j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. In platform replacement strategy
1, platform 1 is used for three consecutive product generations (qmax = 2); in strategy 2, a new
platform is developed for each new product generation (qmax = 0). Whereas strategy 1 benefits from
more platform commonality and less platform development time and costs, strategy 2 benefits from
less platform obsolescence and no platform adaptation times. Figure 2 shows how these different
platform replacement strategies impact the time of entering the market with the different products.
Take for instance the introduction of product 2: when it takes longer to develop a new platform 2
instead of adjusting platform 1 to meet the requirements of product 2 (i.e., if ta2,1 < t
d
2), product 2
will be launched sooner using strategy 1 compared to strategy 2. However, as platform 1 gets more
obsolete, it may well be that developing a new platform is less time-consuming than adjusting the
existing platform 1. For product 3, for instance, platform replacement strategy 1 could involve a
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Figure 3: Cumulative demand distribution for product j after its introduction to the market Tj
and the market introduction by its competitor at time T fj .




We characterize the demand for each product j over time t after its product introduction by a chi-
squared distribution, resembling its S-shaped product life cycle (see Day (1981)). The assumption
of chi-squared distributed demand is also supported by the sales statistics in Figure 1; moreover it
has the advantage of being easily adapted using different parameter settings.
Without loss of insights, we assume the degree of freedom (k) of the chi-squared distribution equal
to 4. Product demand after its introduction is given by the cumulative density function F . We
relate the chi-square distributed demand to the speed of innovation, characterized by λ. If λ = 1,
we assume half of a product’s demand is realized before the subsequent product is introduced.
When λ < 1, the speed of innovation is slower, and more than half of demand is realized before the
subsequent product is introduced. The opposite holds for λ > 1.
The market demand for product j is impacted by the introduction of the subsequent product
j+ 1, and the cannibalization effect from this product. When product j+ 1 is launched, we assume
a portion αc of the demand for product j is cannibalized or lost, with 0 ≤ αc ≤ 1 (Mason and Milne,
1994). A higher value of αc means more cannibalization; a value of αc = 1 represents the extreme
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case where demand drops to zero after the introduction of a product successor. We assume that
product j only cannibalizes the demand of product j − 1, and not the former product generations.
Figure 3 illustrates the demand distribution in the period after its introduction.
3.3 Competition
We assume the focal firm has one competitor, who faces the same product introductions (inspired by
the same technologies) and also decides on its platform replacements. A firm can replace platforms
slower, faster, or at the same speed as its competitor. At each new product introduction, the focal
firm competes with its competitor to capture market share.
The company that is the first to introduce the j-th product generation, has a time-to-market of
Tj . The time-to-market of the market follower is denoted by T
f
j ≥ Tj . The firm’s time-to-market
depends on its platform replacement planning, as discussed previously. We assume that, as soon as
the market follower introduces its product at time T fj , market demand is shared equally between
both companies.
We consider both the situation where the focal firm and its competitor make their platform
replacement decisions independently from each other, as well as when they take into account each
other’s possible platform replacement decision. In the latter situation, we derive a Nash equilibrium
of the focal firm’s and competitor’s platform replacement planning decisions.
3.4 Performance objectives
Our study considers three distinct performance objectives (i.e., market share, profit and risk) which
are prevalent in the new product introduction and platform development literature. Platform
replacement planning impacts the speed at which new products can be introduced into the market.
This speed-to-market is a critical factor for sustaining competitive advantage and market share
(Datar et al., 1997; Kerin et al., 1992), as well as for profitability (McNally et al., 2011). Profit and
its constitutes sales, driven by market share, and (development) costs, are well-known measures in
the platform-based product development literature (Krishnan and Gupta, 2001b). This explains
why we study market share and profit as performance objectives. Since there is often a trade-off
between profit and risk (Van Mieghem, 2011), and since risk plays an important role in new product
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Table 3: Calculation of market share under changing environments.
The first objective we consider is the maximization of the market share, defined as the proportion
of total demand captured by the focal firm. Assuming the price at which products are sold to be
fixed over time and equal to 1, revenue is driven purely by market share. We denote market share
for product j obtained by the focal firm by Vj . As F (∞) = 1, the maximum attainable revenue




Vj , and the average market share per product is reported by:









Table 3 shows different situations that impact the market share Vj . For instance, suppose the
focal company is the first mover (i.e., it launches product j at time Tj , earlier than its competitor’s
launch time at T fj ), and there is no cannibalization from subsequent product introductions. Then,
the focal firm can respond to all market demand until his competitor enters the market at time
T fj , at which point the remaining market demand is divided equally between both companies. The




1.0− F (T fj )
)
. This setting is also illustrated in Figure 3.
The second performance metric that we consider is profit, which depends on the market share
V just explained and platform development costs. Each time a new platform is developed, a
development cost is incurred, which we express by αd, where 0 ≤ αd ≤ 1. For instance, the
platform development costs at Barco, the provider of high-tech medical screens, represents the
lion’s hare of their product cost, equaling around 35% of revenues (αd = 0.35) (Boute et al., 2017).




the number of platforms developed (see Table 1), and the average profit per product equals:
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Parameter Values Interpretation when parameter value increases
αa {0, 0.50, 1} Longer platform adaptation time
αd {0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8} Higher platform development cost
αc {0, 0.50, 1} More cannibalization
λ {0.5, 1, 4, 20} Higher speed of innovation








Finally, we consider risk, measured by variance of profits Π (Van Mieghem, 2011), as the third
performance metric. In our model, the focal firm’s profit under a given setting and for a given
platform replacement decision, also depends on the competitor’s platform replacement planning.
As the competitor’s platform replacement timings are unknown to the focal firm, the focal firm’s
profit is subject to uncertainty. Some stakeholders may want to minimize this profit uncertainty.






3.5 Design of the simulation experiment
We set up a computational experiment to analyze the optimal platform replacement planning strat-
egy under different environments. The parameter values established for our experimental design
are summarized in Table 4 and cover a wide range of industry environments. The interpretation
of these parameters was explained in the previous section (we provide a glossary of all notations
used in Appendix). Platform development times tdi are assumed to be uniformly distributed be-
tween 50 and 150 periods. In total, 144 settings are observed over n = 60 product introductions.
The simulation model was coded in Visual Studio C++. We used common random numbers and
450,000 simulation iterations in order to guarantee accuracy of our results. For each simulation
run, we captured market share, profit, and risk of both the firm and its competitor in each of the
144 settings, and given the platform replacement planning decision of each party.
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Figure 4: Market share, profit, and risk under different platform replacement frequencies averaged
over all computational results (N= optimal replacement frequency).
4 Results and insights
We will first discuss the general impact of platform replacement planning on the firm’s performance.
Next, we discuss the impact of the different environment parameters: platform adaptation time αa,
platform development cost αd, innovation speed λ, and cannibalization αc. Last, we will discuss
the impact of competition.
4.1 Impact of performance objectives
We evaluate firm performance in three aspects: market share, profit, and risk. Figure 4 reflects the
firm’s performance averaged over all simulations in the 144 settings in our simulation experiment.
We report performance in function of the platform replacement frequency, equal to 4−qmax. When
qmax = 0, a new platform is developed for each new product and the platform replacement frequency
is high. When qmax = 4, a platform is used for 4 consecutive product generations, and the platform
replacement frequency is low.
We observe a concave relationship between the platform replacement frequency and the mar-
ket share and profit, whereas it is convex related with risk. In other words, extreme platform
replacement strategies (i.e., always or never replacing) are often suboptimal, and the right balance
must be sought. This makes practical sense, as it is too costly and time-consuming to develop a
new platform for each new product, just as it becomes too costly and time-consuming to adapt an
obsolete platform to match the needs of new product innovations. When risk minimization is key,
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Figure 5: Impact of platform adaptation time on optimal platform replacement frequency under
different firm objectives (◦ = optimal replacement frequency under short platform adaptation time
(αa = 0) and  = optimal replacement frequency under long platform adaptation time (αa = 1)).
one wants to avoid extreme platform replacement strategies (i.e., replacing platforms very slow or
fast), as the profits for these strategies can vary a lot under different settings and under different
platform replacement decisions of the competitor.
We observe that the optimal platform replacement frequency is higher under market share max-
imization when compared to profit maximization. This can be explained by the fact that a myopic
focus on market share ignores the costs of developing a new platform, and hence platforms will be
replaced faster. Under risk minimization, we observe that platforms are replaced less frequently. As
different departments in a firm often have different performance objectives (e.g., operations, sales,
and finance might strive to minimize costs, maximize market share, or minimize risk, respectively),
it explains why certain companies struggle to make platform replacement decisions. Moreover,
it means that companies with a similar product portfolio might still adapt a different platform
replacement strategy, depending on their performance objective.
4.2 Impact of platform adaptation time and development cost
Figure 5 illustrates how the platform replacement strategies differ in function of platform adaptation
time αa. If adaptation times increase, the disadvantage of long platform development times (and
the subsequent risk of introducing a product later than the competitor) becomes less pronounced.
Therefore, we see that as platform adaptation times increase, platforms are replaced faster under
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Figure 6: Impact of platform development cost on optimal platform replacement frequency under
different firm objectives (◦= optimal replacement frequency under low platform development cost
(αd = 0) and  = optimal platform development cost under high platform development cost
(αd = 0.8)).
market share or profit maximization. The opposite is true under risk minimization. The explanation
of this effect comes down to the impact of a change in the platform adaptation time on uncertainty
in profits. The risk, or uncertainty in profits, stems from the fact that the focal firm does not know
his competitor’s time to market. The latter is linked to his platform replacement strategy. When
platform adaptations times are short compared to the platform development times, it is relatively
certain that the time-to-market is later than competition when platforms are frequently replaced
(due to the relatively long development times). With longer platform adaptation times, however,
the expectation of being later to the market becomes less certain. This makes less frequent platform
replacements more appealing to reduce risk.
The impact of platform development cost αd is as expected: we find that platforms are more
frequently replaced under lower platform development costs when profit is maximized (see Fig. 6).
This is in line with the findings of Kang et al. (2012) who show that lower platform development
costs shorten a platform’s lifetime. As development costs increase, firms want to leverage the larger
development costs over more product generations. Whereas previous research has mostly focused
on the impact of platform development costs, our results show the importance of taking platform
adaptation time into account as well, when making platform replacement decisions.
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Figure 7: The impact of speed of innovation on platform replacement frequency under different
firm objectives (◦= optimal replacement frequency under low innovation speed (λ = 0.5) and  =
optimal replacement frequency under high innovation speed (λ = 20)).
4.3 Impact of innovation speed and cannibalization
In this section, we discuss the impact of innovation speed and the level of cannibalization of new
product introductions. Results are shown in Figure 7 where a smaller value of λ indicates slower
innovation speed, i.e., the speed of technological innovation in the industry is slower. We observe
that innovation speed does not necessarily have a marked impact on optimal replacement planning,
but when it does, a higher innovation speed would lead to slower platform replacement, and vice
versa. This is in line with Thomas (2014) and Chai et al. (2012) who found that technological
turbulence increases the platform lifetime to reduce development cost and adapt faster to changes.
We do observe, however, that differences in performance between the different replacement strate-
gies become less pronounced as innovations are introduced more rapidly. This can be explained as
follows. If innovations speed is low, there is less cannibalization as the time between new product
introductions is longer, and the full potential of the demand can be realized. If innovation speed is
high, on the other hand, cannibalization leads to a higher loss of market share. Our results show
that the impact of cannibalization is almost identical to that of innovation speed: higher levels of
cannibalization result in lower profits/market share (for the same innovation speed).
In Figure 8 we visualize the firm’s average profit and risk (i.e., profit variance) from different
platform replacement strategies, under different settings. We refer to this as the mean variance or
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Figure 8: Platform replacement frequency decisions on the mean variance frontier depend on the
speed of innovation λ, the level of cannibalization αc, the platform development time αd and the
platform adaptation time αa. A solid circle represents the platform replacement strategy with the
highest return-to-risk ratio, a dotted circle represents the platform replacement strategy with the
highest profit.
efficiency frontier (see Van Mieghem (2007) and references therein). Note that platform replacement
strategies that are not part of the efficiency frontier are not visualized. When the company is risk-
neutral, it will choose the platform replacement strategy with the highest profit (each time circled
with a dotted line in Figure 8). However, when the company is risk-averse, it trades off profit against
the risk. In Figure 8, platform replacement strategies with the highest return-to-risk ratio (i.e.,
average profit over profit variance) are each time circled with a solid line. This shows the optimal
platform replacement decision for a firm who wants to take both profit and risk into account. We
find that a slower platform replacement generally goes hand-in-hand with lower risk (except for
αa = 0), and that the extreme of frequent platform replacements (i.e., a replacement frequency of
4) is never part of the efficiency frontier for the settings considered.
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Competitor’s platform replacement frequency






4 (high) 0.097 -0.139 -0.112 0.092 0.334
3 0.352 0.152 0.244 0.349 0.384
2 0.388 0.106 0.199 0.383 0.440
1 0.245 0.014 0.042 0.238 0.471
0 (low) 0.029 -0.014 -0.007 0.026 0.276
Competitor’s platform replacement frequency






4 (high) 0.098 0.352 0.388 0.245 0.029
3 -0.139 0.153 0.106 0.014 -0.014
2 -0.112 0.244 0.200 0.042 -0.007
1 0.093 0.349 0.383 0.239 0.026
0 (low) 0.334 0.384 0.440 0.471 0.276
Table 5: Profits of the focal firm and its competitor in the setting αa = 0.5, λ = 1, αd = 0.2, αc = 1.
Note that from the simulation results, we also observe that the profit loss of sub-optimal profit-
maximizing platform replacement planning increases as platform adaptation time, innovation speed,
and cannibalization increase.
4.4 Impact of competition
Our simulation reports the focal firm’s performance for each platform replacement strategy of the
competitor, and for each of the 144 settings (as illustrated for one such setting in Table 5). In the
results discussed above, we each time averaged the focal firm’s performances under the competitor’s
different strategies for platform replacement. We will now study in more detail the impact of the
competitor’s platform replacement decisions.
We consider two situations. In the first situation, we analyze the focal firm’s performance under
the assumption that the focal firm and its competitor decide their platform replacement strategy
independently from each other. In the second situation, we analyze the focal firm’s performance
when the focal firm and its competitor change their platform replacement strategy as a response to
each other’s platform replacement strategy. In the latter situation, we look for the Nash equilibrium.
We illustrate the difference between these two situations with the example in Table 5. First, if the
focal firm and competitor independently from each other determine their platform replacement
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strategy, the focal firm would be well advised to choose platform replacement frequency 3, 2 or 1,
if the competitor chooses platform replacement frequency 3 or 2, 4 or 1, and 0, respectively (see
the bold figures in Table 5). Second, based on the simulation output, we can also use the Nash
equilibrium. The reasoning is that if the focal firm opts for replacement frequency 2 or 3, the
competitor will opt for frequency 3, and the focal firm will in turn opt for frequency 3. If the focal
firm opts for frequency 1, the competitor will opt for frequency 2. In turn the focal firm will change
its decision to frequency 3. Consequently, the steady state is that the focal and its competitor opt
for platform replacement frequency 3.
We now discuss the general findings (over all 144 scenarios). For the situation where the firm
and competitor make platform replacement decisions independently from each other, Figure 9
summarizes the optimal strategies of the focal firm depending on (1) the competitor’s platform
replacement strategy, and (2) the performance objective being considered. Under market share and
profit maximization, we find that the focal firm should adopt a slightly higher or lower replacement
frequency in response to competitor’s extremely low or high replacement frequency, respectively.
With respect to risk, we find that there is an overall tendency toward replacing more slowly or
at equal frequency as the competitor. These insights contribute to those of Kang et al. (2012),
who modeled the impact of competitive intensity (measured as the probability of the competitor
introducing a product) on platform replacement. They found that, contrary to expectation, higher
competition caused a lower replacement frequency, to reduce development costs.
For the situation where the firm and competitor take into account each other’s platform re-
placement strategy, we find that both companies tend to choose the same platform replacement
frequency, aiming at simultaneous product introduction (see also the example in Table 5, where
both the focal and competitive firm select a replacement frequency of 3). However, this equilibrium
often (i.e., in 100 of the 144 settings analyzed) does not lead to the maximum achievable profit for
both firms. For instance, the Nash equilibrium in Table 5 leads to a total profit of 0.305 (0.152
+ 0.153), 44.7% lower than the maximum total profit of 0.552 when both parties would choose a
platform replacement frequency of zero. The average loss in profit in the Nash equilibrium over all
144 scenarios is around 28.5%.
We learn that competition has an important impact on the firm’s platform replacement decisions
and their performance. This means that platform replacement decisions should not only be driven
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Figure 9: Impact of competitor’s platform planning on platform replacement decisions under dif-
ferent performance objectives (•= optimal replacement frequency under high platform replacement
frequency of the competitor, and = optimal replacement frequency under low platform replace-
ment frequency of the competitor).
by a firm’s internal development process and technological innovation, but should also take into
account the competitive environment.
5 Conclusion
In this article we address the question when a platform should be replaced to cope with future
product generations. Replacing a platform requires substantial development time and costs, but
failing to do so may result in platform obsolescence, leading to longer platform adaptation times
to customize the platform to the latest product. Platform replacement planning impacts not only
development costs, but also time-to-market, which in turn impacts the firm’s agility to capture
market demand. The latter also depends on the competitor’s platform replacement decisions. We
develop a simulation model that takes all these dynamics into account.
Our analysis shows that higher innovation speed does not necessarily lead to more frequent plat-
form replacement, and that replacing platforms faster than one’s competitor is not always favorable.
Optimal platform replacement timing is strongly dependent on performance objectives: sharehold-
ers may want to minimize financial risk, sales are driven by market share maximization, whereas
good management strives to maximize profit. Given the impact of platform replacement on many
levels, different departments may have conflicting opinions, leading to philosophical discussions
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and more challenges into reaching platform replacement decisions. Using our model, such internal
philosophical discussions can rely on factual analysis objectively assessed.
The results in our paper are based on a simulation model. Future research could focus on
extending our model and relaxing certain assumptions. For instance, a limitation of our model is
that we assume market demand is divided equally when two firms are active in the market, but
other settings may also be relevant for future research, e.g., what happens when a larger portion of
the demand remains with the first mover. Moreover, it would be interesting to check the validity of
our insights when a firm has multiple platforms simultaneously. While our model assumes there is
only one platform in use at a time, future research could allow for a dynamic platform replacement
frequency, meaning that the frequency could change over time. This could lead to new insights
under the game-theoretical analysis where we consider the response of the competitor. Another
extension could consider the impact of having more than two firms competing for demand.
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n Total number of products
λ Rate of new technology/innovation becoming available under the Poisson distribution
k Setting (degrees of freedom) of the chi-squared distribution
q The gap between the platform and product, with qmax the maximum gap
qmax + 1 Number of products derived from the same platform
4− qmax Platform replacement frequency
n
qmax+1
Number of platforms developed in total
tdi The development time of platform i
taj,q The adaptation time to derive product j from platform i = j − q
αa Percentage of platform development time, used to calculate the adaptation time
Tj Time-to-market of the first mover for product j
T fj Time-to-market of the market follower for product j
αc
The level of cannibalization, reflected by the percentage of lost sales
of the product j − 1 when product j is introduced
Vj Market share of product j (with the maximum Vj equal to 1)
αd Percentage of market share, used to calculate the development cost
Π Total profit over all n products
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